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  Few topics in development economics, and indeed in economics as a whole, have 
caused  a more  heated controversy  than  industrial policy. Not just its effectiveness and 
generalisability, but also its definition and very existence have been debated. Its opponents 
have declared its non-existence, irrelevance, ineffectiveness, and demise many times, but the 
issue refuses to go away. There has to be something more than the irrepressible human 
tendency to search for a magic solution for their problems for this to be the case. 
  The aim of this paper is to try to  go beyond what I see as an unproductive 
confrontation between the proponents and the opponents of industrial policy and explore how 
we can take the debate forward. I cannot claim to be impartial in this endeavour, as I have 
been a party to this debate. I will, however, do my best to find the common grounds and   2 
extract some theoretical and policy lessons from both sides of the debate. 
 
 
The Industrial Policy Debate: Conceptual Issues and Neglected Facts 
Before I discuss what I think are the main lessons from the industrial policy debate, I 
will briefly review the debate itself. While I cannot avoid pronouncing judgments on at least 
some of the arguments advanced during the debate, the main purpose of the review is not to 
declare scores. It is to highlight some conceptual issues and neglected facts that help us see 
the debate from what I hope to be a broader but more pragmatic point of view.   
Literally interpreted, industrial policy should mean policy that affects industry, in the 
same way in which agricultural policy means policy that affects agriculture and monetary 
policy means policy that affects monetary variables. And indeed, many commentators on 
industrial policy on both sides of the argument, follow this definition (see Chang 1994, pp. 
58-61, for some examples). 
However, when we talk about “industrial policy”, the majority of us do not mean any 
policy that affect industry but a very particular type of policy that affects industries. It is what 
is commonly known as “selective industrial policy” or “targeting” – namely, a policy that 
deliberately favours particular industries over others, against market signals, usually (but not 
necessarily) to enhance efficiency and promote productivity growth.   
Industrial policy in this sense is usually associated with the development experiences 
of Japan and other East Asian economies (South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) in the post-
World War II period. As I shall explain below, however, industrial policy, even in this narrow 
sense, has been practised well beyond such time and place. Even so, let me start with the 
debate on post-WWII East Asian industrial policy, as this is what has framed our current 
thinking on industrial policy.   3 
 
The modern debate on industrial policy was started in the late 1970s, with the rise of 
Japan. Although the practice of (selective) industrial policy had been noticed among the 
scholars of post-war French economic policy in the 1960s, it was as a part of the broader 
exercise of “indicative planning” (Shonfield 1965; Cohen 1977). With the debate on Japan, 
industrial policy was brought to the centre stage, not least because Japan was the first country 
that used the term industrial policy (sangyo seisaku) to mean selective industrial policy. By 
the late 1980s, it came to be widely accepted that strong industrial policy was also practised 
in South Korea, Taiwan, and (in a very different way) Singapore, which had until then been 
thought to be free-trade, free-market economies. 
In the early days of the debate on industrial policy in East Asia, some denied its very 
existence. Some of it was out of sheer unwillingness to recognize any fact that goes against 
one’s deep-held beliefs. For example, the free-trade economist Bela Balassa argued, as late as 
in 1988, that the role of the state in Korea “apart from the promotion of shipbuilding and 
steel . . . has been to create a modern infrastructure, to provide a stable incentive system, and 
to ensure that government bureaucracy will help rather than hinder exports” (Balassa 1988, p. 
S286). However, more often it was based on an honest misunderstanding of the ways in 
which industrial policy worked in these countries. For example, Trezise (1983) argued that 
Japan did not have much industrial policy on the “objective”  ground that its industrial 
subsidies and government loans as a proportion of GDP were below the OECD average.   
However, subsequent debate revealed that industrial policy in East Asia involved a 
lot more than handing out subsidies and providing trade protectionism (e.g., tariffs, import 
bans, quotas, domestic regulations at least partially intended to curb imports). Industrial 
policy measures in East Asia included: (i) coordination of complementary investments (the 
so-called  Big Push); (ii) coordination of competing investments through entry regulation,   4 
“investment cartels”, and (in declining industries) negotiated capacity cuts; (iii) policies to 
ensure scale economies (e.g., licensing conditional upon production scale, emphasis on the 
infant industries starting to export from early on, state-mediated mergers and acquisitions); 
(iv) regulation on technology imports (e.g., screening for overly obsolete technologies, cap on 
technology licensing royalties); (v) regulation on foreign direct investment (e.g., entry and 
ownership restrictions, local contents requirement, technology transfer requirements, export 
requirements); (vi) mandatory worker training for firms above a certain size, in order to 
resolve the collective action problem in the supply of skilled workers due to the possibility of 
“poaching”; (vii) the state acting as a venture capitalist and incubating high-tech firms; (viii) 
export promotion (e.g., export subsidies, export loan guarantees, marketing help from the 
state trading agency); (ix)  government  allocation of foreign exchanges, with top priority 
going to capital goods imports (especially for export industries) and the bottom priority to 
luxury consumption good imports.   
The debate on the existence and the definition of industrial policy in East Asia alone 
has suggested two important points that we have to bear in mind when assessing industrial 
policy in general.   
First, the extent of industrial policy cannot be identified purely in terms of 
quantifiable measures, especially those that involve financial transfers. As can be seen from 
the above list, many industrial policy measures do not even involve any financial transfer, 
possibly  except in the most roundabout general-equilibrium sense.  By looking at  only 
quantifiable indicators, we significantly under-estimate the extent and the depth of industrial 
policy, both at the sectoral level and at the economy-wide level. 
Second, we cannot assess the impacts of a country’s industrial policy solely on the 
basis of the performance (however measured) of the “targeted” sectors (World Bank 1993 and 
Lee 1996 are the two most frequently cited examples along this line). Looking at sectors   5 
separately, we get to ignore the impacts of “super-sectoral” industrial policy measures that 
address issues like complementarities, linkages, and externalities among sectors.
1
Of course, as the critics of industrial policy rightly point out, the mere co-existence 
of industrial policy, however widespread, and rapid industrial economic development in East 
 
                                                       
1  In addition to being unable to address the super-sectoral dimensions of industrial policy, 
World Bank (1993) and Lee (1996) have the following problems. Looking at 38 industrial 
sectors (basically at the 3-digit level) in Korea between 1962 and 1983, Lee (1996) found 
largely negative correlation between a sector’s receipts of government supports (e.g., tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers, tax incentives, and subsidized loans) and its performance, measured by a 
number of indicators (e.g., labour productivity, total factor productivity or TFP, and capital 
intensity). The study should be commended for collecting a lot of detailed data and looking at 
more than TFP, which has a lot of conceptual and practical problems, but focusing on 
quantifiable measures, it could not capture many important aspects of industrial policy, even 
at the sectoral level (e.g., getting scale economies right, coordinating competing investments). 
Moreover, when infant industries require 10, 20, or even 30 years to mature, assessing 
Korean industrial policy in 1983 gives a bias against it – Korea’s main industrial policy drive, 
the Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation (HCI), was launched only in 1973. Third, by 
stopping in 1983, the study underestimates the performances of the young heavy and 
chemical industries, which suffered disproportionately in the 1979-82 economic downturn, 
prompted by exogenous factors (oil price rise, monetarist policies in the US). World Bank 
(1993), looking at Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, assumed that sectors (defined at 2-digit industry 
classification level) with higher value-added components or higher capital intensity were 
supported more by the government, thus obviating (perhaps unintentionally) the problem of 
relying only on quantifiable variables. It tried to correlate a sector’s value-added component 
and capital intensity with its performance (measured, unfortunately, only in terms of TFP) 
and found positive correlation only in Japan. However, the East Asian government targeted 
sectors at a much more disaggregated level than the 2-digit one, and never on simple grounds 
like capital intensity or value-added component. For example, the textile industry in Korea, 
whose good performance the World Bank takes as a sign that “neglected” industries did quite 
well, was in fact one of the most “targeted” sectors until the mid-1980s because its role as the 
main foreign exchange earner (Chang 1995, ch. 3, appendix; also see Rodrik 1994).   6 
Asia does not prove that the former has caused the latter. As they point out, it is possible that 
these countries could have grown even faster, had they not used industrial policy (Pack and 
Saggi 2006). 
This is logically possible, but if that were to be the case, these countries must have 
had some country-specific “countervailing forces” that were so powerful that they cancelled 
out all the harmful effects of market-distorting industrial policy and  still generated the 
highest growth rates in human history (6-7% annual growth rate in per capita income over 
four decades). I find this highly implausible. Are these sceptics really seriously suggesting 
that, without industrial policy, these powerful countervailing forces would have made the 
East Asian countries grow at – what? – 9%, 10%, or even 12%, when no country in history 
has ever grown at faster than 7% for an extended period, industrial policy or not? 
Anyhow, no convincing story built around these countervailing forces has been 
offered. Culture (leading to high savings rate, strict work ethic, high-quality bureaucracy), the 
legacy of Japanese colonialism (leading to exceptionally high literacy and broad industrial 
base), and Cold War politics (leading to exceptionally high foreign aid and special access to 
the US market) are frequently cited candidates, but none of them even pass the minimum 
factual tests (Chang 2007, ch. 9, on culture; Chang 2006, on Japanese colonialism and the 
Cold War).
2
                                                       
2  Let me provide some basic factual refutation of these “countervailing forces” arguments, a 
full treatment which is beyond the scope of the paper. Before their economic development, 
the East Asians were typically described as lazy, un-enterprising, individualistic people, 
“living for today” (see Chang 2007, ch. 9). Korea’ savings rate on the eve of its economic 
miracle was barely 5% and started rising after growth took off. At the end of the Japanese 
colonial rule, literacy ratio in Korea was only 22% and its industrial base was smaller than 
that of Ghana (Chang 2006). After the 1950s, Korea and Taiwan did not get an exceptionally 
high amount of foreign aid (Chang 2006). As far as I know, no one has provided any concrete 
     7 
Of course, as Pack and Saggi (2006) points out, it is impossible to definitely prove 
that East Asia could have done better or worse without industrial policy, as “the relevant 
counterfactuals are not available” (p.  268). However, not all  counterfactuals  are equally 
plausible, and  the counterfactual supposed by the critics of  industrial policy is highly 
implausible. This nudges us towards the conclusion that industrial policy worked in East Asia. 
Moreover, once we go beyond the late-20
th century East Asian experiences, there are 
quite a lot of evidence that further strengthens (although once again cannot “prove”) the case 
for industrial policy. There are three such sets of evidence. 
First of all, if we broaden our spatial horizon, we realise that successful industrial 
policy experiences in the late 20
th century are not confined to East Asia. We’ve already 
mentioned the French industrial policy, but quite a few other European economies, such as 
Finland, Norway, and  Austria, also pursued (selective)  industrial policy,  often  with even 
greater successes  than France, during this period (Katzenstein 1985).  Certain  local 
governments in Italy (e.g., Emilia-Romagna) and Germany (e.g., Baden-Württemberg) also 
pursued effective industrial policy, promoting particular “industrial districts” through directed 
credits (from local banks, often owned by the local government), R&D support, and export 
marketing help (Piore and Sabel 1984). Interestingly, all these countries had high growth 
rates between the 1950s and the 1980s, although obviously this is not to say that industrial 
policy was solely responsible for their growth.
3
                                                                                                                                                                     
evidence for the “special market access” story. Until the 1980s, Korea and Taiwan were 
buying up textile quotas from other developing countries that could not even fill their MFA 
(multi-fibre agreement) quotas for the US, showing that, even if it was there, the special 
market access could not provide enough export demands. 
   
3  Of the 16 largest OECD economies studied by Maddison (1989), between 1950 and 1987, 
the seven fastest growing economies, in per capita terms, were Japan (6%), Austria (3.9%), 
Germany (3.8%), Italy (3.7%), Finland (3.6%), Norway (3.4%), and France (3.2%).   8 
While championing the free-market ideology during this period (although not before 
that – see below), the US government also ran a huge (if somewhat wasteful) industrial policy 
programme under the guise of R&D support for defence and public health. Between the 
1950s and the 1980s, the US federal government financed anywhere between 47% and 65% 
of national R&D spending, as against around 20% in Japan and Korea and around 30% in 
Europe (Mowery and Rosenberg 1993, p. 41, table 2.3).
4
  Second, if we also go back in time, we realise that there are even more industrial 
policy success stories. Contrary to the popular myth, in the 19
th and the early 20
th centuries, 
all of today’s rich countries, except for the Netherlands and (before World War I) Switzerland, 
practised significant degrees of protectionism for substantial periods (table 1; see Bairoch 
1993 and Chang 2002 for further details). Although these tariffs were not as systematically 
calibrated as those used in the late 20
th century, they were definitely parts of (selective) 
industrial policy insofar as they were deliberately different across sectors. In addition to tariff 
protection, many of these countries provided subsidies to promote targeted industries, set up 
state-owned enterprises or public-private joint ventures for risky projects, regulated foreign 
direct investments, and implemented many other measures of industrial policy during this 
period (Chang 2002; Chang 2007). 
  Many of the industries where the 
US still has technological edge would not have developed, or even emerged at all, without 
public funding of R&D – aircraft, computer, microchips, internet, and genetic engineering. 
                                                       
4  The share of federal government in total R&D spending was 5.36% in 1953, 56.8% in 1955, 
64.6% in 1960, 64.9% in 1965, 57.1% in 1970, 51.7% in 1875, 47.2% in 1980, 47.9% in 
1985, and 47.3% in 1989 (estimated).   9 
Table 1. Average Tariff Rates on Manufactured Products for Selected Developed 
Countries in Their Early Stages of Development 





2  1913  1925  1931  1950 
Austria
3  R  15-20  18  16  24  18 
Belgium
4  6-8  9-10  9  15  14  11 
Canada  5  15  n.a.  23  28  17 
Denmark  25-35  15-20  14  10  n.a.  3 
France  R (20)
5  12-15  20  21  30  18 
Germany
6  8-12  4-6  13  20  21  26 
Italy  n.a.  8-10  18  22  46  25 
Japan
7  R  5  30  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands
4  6-8  3-5  4  6  n.a.  11 
Russia  R  15-20  84  R  R  R 
Spain  R  15-20  41  41  63  n.a. 
Sweden  R  3-5  20  16  21  9 
Switzerland  8-12  4-6  9  14  19  n.a. 
United Kingdom  45-55  0  0  5  n.a.  23 
United States  35-45
  40-50  44
  37  48  14 
Source: Chang (2002), p. 17, table 2.1, largely based on Bairoch (1993), p. 40, table 3.3, 
except for Canada, which is from Taylor (1948), pp. 102-8 and p. 398. 
Notes:   
R= Numerous and important restrictions existed, making average tariff rates not meaningful. 
1. World Bank (1991, p. 97, Box table 5.2) provides a similar table, partly drawing on 
Bairoch. However, the World Bank figures, although in most cases very similar to Bairoch’s 
figures, are unweighted averages, which are obviously less preferable to weighted average 
figures that Bairoch provides. 
2. These are very approximate rates, and give range of average rates, not extremes. 
3. Austria-Hungary before 1925. 
4. In 1820, Belgium was united with the Netherlands. 
5. According to the estimate by Nye (1991), the average tariff rate, measured by customs 
revenue as a percentage of net import values, in France during 1821-5 was 20.3%, as against 
53.1% for Britain, which is in line with the 45-55% range estimated by Bairoch. 
6. The 1820 figure is for Prussia only. 
7. Before 1911, Japan was obliged to keep low tariff rates (up to 5%) through a series of 
unequal treaties with the European countries and the USA. The World Bank table cited in 
note 1 above gives Japan’s unweighted average tariff rate for all goods (and not just 
manufactured goods) for the years 1925, 1930, 1950 as 13%, 19%, 4%. 
 
Interestingly,  Britain and the US –  the supposed homes of free trade –  had  the 
world’s highest levels of tariff protection during their respective catch-up periods (45-55%) 
(table 1). This was no coincidence. Robert Walpole, the so-called first British Prime Minister,   10 
is credited to have been the first person to launch a comprehensive infant industry programme 
in 1721 (Brisco 1907), strongly influencing Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury Secretary 
of the US, who first developed the theory of infant industry protection (Hamilton 1791). The 
targeted protections that Germany and Sweden provided to their nascent heavy industries in 
the late 19
th and the early 20
th centuries are well known, but even Belgium, one of the less 
protected economies, provided targeted protection. In the mid-19
th  century, when the 
country’s average industrial tariff was around 10%, the textile industries had tariffs rates of 
30-60% and the iron industry 85% (Milward and Saul, 1977 p. 174). At least for the 1870-
1913 period, there is even evidence that there was a positive correlation between tariff rate 
and rate of growth (O’Rourke 2000; Vamvakidis 2002; Clemens and Williams 2004).
5
Third, the long-term historical experiences of the developing countries also provide 
some food for thoughts. Drawing on numerous studies that show a negative cross-section 
correlation between a country’s degree of “openness” (variously measured) and its growth 
performance, the mainstream consensus is that industrial policy in developing countries since 
the 1960s has not worked. Even if we ignore many criticisms of these cross-section 
econometric studies (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000; Chang 2005) and accept such conclusion, 
it must be pointed out that the time-series evidence tells us a rather different story.   
   
Until the 1870s, most of today’s developing countries practised free trade, either 
because they were colonies or because they were bound by the so-called “unequal treaties” 
that deprived them of tariff autonomy and imposed low, uniform rate of tariff (3-5%). 
                                                       
5  Irwin (2002) argued that this correlation was driven by high tariffs imposed for revenue 
reasons in the New World countries (the US, Canada, Argentina, in his sample) that were 
growing fast for other reasons (e.g., rich natural resource endowments). However, the US was 
the home of infant industry protection at the time and many of its tariffs were not for revenue 
reasons. Moreover, O’Rourke (2000) and Lehmann & O’Rourke (2008) have shown that the 
positive tariff-growth statistical correlation is not primarily driven by the New World.   11 
However, their growth performances during this period were very poor (table 2). Interestingly, 
when the Latin American countries gained tariff autonomy in the 1870s and the 1880s, their 
per capita income growth rate shot up from 0.1% during 1820-70 to 1.8% during 1870-1913, 
making it one of the two fastest growing regions in the world (table 2).
6
 
   
Table 2. Historical Rates of Economic Growth by Major Regions   
during and after the Age of Imperialism (1820-1950) 
(annual per capita GDP growth rate, %) 
 
Regions  1820-70  1870-1913  1913-50  1950-73 
Western Europe  0.95  1.32  0.76  4.08 
Western Offshoots*  1.42  1.81  1.55  2.44 
Japan  0.19  1.48  0.89  8.05 
Asia excluding 
Japan 
-0.11  0.38  -0.02  2.92 
Latin America  0.10  1.81  1.42  2.52 
Eastern Europe and 
former USSR 
0.64  1.15  1.50  3.49 
Africa  0.12  0.64  1.02  2.07 
World  0.53  1.30  0.91  2.93 
*Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA. 
 
Source: Maddison (2001), p. 126, table 3-1a. 
 
The growth performance of the developing countries during the “bad old days” of ISI 
(import-substitution industrialisation) was a vast improvement over their performance before, 
and, more importantly, has not been matched by their performance since the 1980s, when 
they abandoned much of their industrial policy. Per capita income in developing countries 
grew at 3% per year during 1960-80 (World Bank 1980, p. 99, Table SA.1). Its growth rate 
fell to just above half that (1.7%) in the next 20 years (calculated from World Bank 2002), 
when these countries liberalised and opened up their economies. The growth slowdown was 
                                                       
6  Clemens and Williamson (2004) argue, on the basis of an econometric analysis, that around 
1/3 of this growth differential between Asia and Latin America during 1870-1913 can be 
explained by the differences in tariff autonomy.   12 
particularly striking in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, two regions that most 
faithfully implemented market-oriented reforms during this period. Per capita income in the 
two regions grew respectively at 3.1% and 1.6% per year during 1960-80 (World Bank 1980, 
p. 99, Table SA.1), whie it grew at 0.5% and -0.3% during 1980-2004 (calculated from the 
World Bank and the UNDP data sets).   
The above sets of evidence, as well as the evidence about the East Asian experience 
that we discussed earlier, do not prove anything on their own. However, taken together, they 
raise some difficult questions for the sceptics of industrial policy. If industrial policy was not 
confined to East Asia in the late-20
th century, it becomes even more difficult to downplay its 
role in East Asia by resorting to some region- and time-specific “countervailing forces”. Even 
if many countries that have used industrial policy did not succeed, the fact that few of today’s 
rich countries have become rich without industrial policy makes us wonder whether a good 
industrial policy may be a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for economic 
development. Looking at all these sets of facts together, we get to wonder, if industrial policy 
is so bad, how is it that in every era, the fastest growing economies happen to be those with a 
strong industrial policy – Britain during the mid-18
th century and mid-19
th century, the US, 
Germany, and Sweden during the late 19
th and the early 20
th century, East Asia, France, 
Finland, Norway, and Austria in the late 20
th century, and China today. 
Although I think the weight of evidence is, on the whole, rather on the side of (of 
course, intelligently-conducted) industrial policy, we do not need some absolute “proof” of its 
merit, either way, in order to take things forward. As far as we can agree that the chance of 
success for industrial policy is more than negligible, we can still have a productive debate on 
how to make it work better. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, I am going to discuss some of 
the lessons that I think we have learned (or at least should have learned) from the actual 
experiences of and the theoretical debates on industrial policy and to suggest some ways   13 
forward, both theoretically and in terms of pragmatic policy. 
 
 
What Have We Learned?: Lessons from the Experiences and the Debates 
  In this section, drawing on the industrial policy debate and adding some of my own 
take on it, I explore how we can make industrial policy work better. I will look at issues 
surrounding: (i) targeting; (ii) whether the state can “beat the market”; (iii) political economy; 
(iv) bureaucratic capabilities; (v) performance measurement; (vi) export; and (vii) changing 
global environment. Before I proceed, I must be acknowledged that, while quite wide-ranging, 
this list  still  leaves out some  key issues in the industrial policy  debate,  due to space 
constraints, especially the challenges of productive capability-building and the problems due 
to adjustment costs (on these issues, see Lin and Chang 2009; Dosi, Cimoli and Stiglitz (eds.) 
2009). 
 
The Question of Targeting – Selective vs. General Industrial Policy 
After at least three decades of intense debate on industrial policy, few people would 
deny that there are instances where state intervention in industrial development is justified. 
However, many would argue that industrial policy should be of “general” (or “functional”), 
rather than “selective” (or “sectoral”), kind. They argue that the state should concentrate on 
providing things like education, R&D, and infrastructure that benefit all industries equally but 
are likely to be under-provided by the market, rather than trying to “pick winners”  by 
favouring particular sectors or even firms (more on this later). In other words, they reject 
industrial policy in the usual sense, while not rejecting the idea that the state can (and should) 
overcome market failures in relation to industrial development. 
The first problem with this view is that the distinction between selective and general   14 
industrial policies cannot be taken very far. In a world with scarce resources, every policy 
choice you make, however “general” the policy may look, has discriminatory effects that 
amount to targeting. This point is easier to see in relation to R&D – a government giving out 
R&D subsidies implicitly favour R&D-intensive high-tech sectors, but it also applies to 
infrastructure and education, at least the higher end of it. We do not build some abstract 
infrastructure but either a road between the horticultural export region and an airport or a 
railway between a steel town and a seaport. Building that railway, instead of that road, means 
that the government at least implicitly favours the steel industry. Likewise, we do not educate 
some generic engineers, but we educate either chemical engineers or electronics engineers. 
Therefore, a government providing more funding to electronics engineering departments than 
to chemical engineering department is implicitly favouring the electronics industry. The only 
policies that may be called truly “general” are policies regarding basic education and health, 
calling which industrial policies is really stretching the concept beyond reason. Thus seen, 
there is selectivity and targeting involved in virtually every (broadly-defined) industrial 
policy measure. The only real difference is that of the degree. 
If targeting is unavoidable, it may be asked, can we at least say that the less targeted a 
policy is, the better it is? This cannot be said. The more targeted a policy is, the easier the 
monitoring of the beneficiaries is, and therefore the “leakages” are going to be less. Indeed, 
mainstream economists recommend more precise targeting in social policy for this reason (on 
targeting in social policy, see Mkandawire 2005). Why is this point not considered in relation 
to industrial policy? Of course, targeting has its costs. For example, too precise a targeting 
may, in a world with fundamental uncertainty, be bad because it “puts all eggs in one basket”. 
Or it may make lobbying easier (more on this later). Or if a policy is too precisely targeted, it 
makes the beneficiaries too easy to identify, making it difficult for  the government to 
maintain the necessary myth that its policies are impartial. And so on.   15 
The debate on industrial targeting needs to move to a higher level. While accepting its 
potential problems, the inevitability targeting should be acknowledged. We should drop the 
pretence that we can “not target” and try to attain the best possible degree of targeting, which 
may differ across industries and countries. We should stop thinking that there is a linear 
relationship, positive or negative, between the degree of targeting and policy success – some 
degree of targeting is inevitable, while some more of it may be desirable, but too much of it 
may not be good. Perhaps we should think in terms of “targeting within universalism”, as in 
the debate on social policy (Skocpol 1991, as cited in Mkandawire 2005, p. 23), rather than 
“targeting vs. universalism”. 
 
Can the State “Beat the Market”?: Ability, Information, and Perspective 
One of the classic arguments against infant industry protection (and by extension any 
selective industrial policy) is that the private sector would have promoted an industry if it 
were genuinely worth promoting (Baldwin 1969). Given that the government officials by 
definition know less about business than do businessmen, the argument goes, it is inevitable 
that their decisions are likely to be of lower quality than those made by businessmen. In other 
words, the state cannot “beat the market”.   
However, there are quite a few examples in history where government officials made 
investment decisions that blatantly went against market signals, sometimes even using state-
owned enterprises as vehicles, only to build some of the most successful businesses in history. 
The four decades of protection, subsidies, and ban on foreign direct investment in the 
Japanese automobile industry before its world market success, the entry of Korea into the 
steel industry through a state-owned enterprise (POSCO) in 1968 (when the country’s per 
capita income was only 5% that of the US), or Brazil’s entry into the aircraft industry, once 
again through an SOE (EMBRAER) in 1969 (when its per capita income was only 8% that of   16 
the US) are only some of the most spectacular examples (Chang 2002, ch. 2; Chang 2007, ch. 
5; Chang 2008).
7
These cases are euphemistically known as (the  government officials successfully 
correcting) “capital market failures”, but it would be far more honest if we admitted that the 
state can sometimes beat the market. Against this, Pack and Saggi (2006) admit that there are 
capital market failures but argue that the solution should be found in developing the banking 
sector, “perhaps by allowing foreign financial intermediaries into the country” (p. 270) that 
have “modern techniques of evaluating individual projects and managing the riskiness of 
their overall portfolio” (p. 285), rather than in industrial policy. However, this suggestion 
rings hollow today, when those “modern techniques”  have created arguably the biggest 
financial mess in human history. 
   
More importantly, we  do not need  the  assumption that government officials are 
omniscient or even that they are cleverer than capitalists in order to advocate industrial policy. 
The point is that many (although not all) of the “superior” decisions made by the state were 
made not because the government officials were omniscient or cleverer than businessmen but 
because they could look at things from a national and long-term point of view, rather than 
sectional, short-term point of view.   
It was because they saw things from a national point of view that the East Asian 
government officials could prevent domestic firms outbidding each other in licensing foreign 
technologies or could take externalities into account and encourage things like exporting and 
training beyond what seems “rational” to individual businessmen. It was because they could 
take a more long-term view that the Korean and the Brazilian states could set up firms like 
                                                       
7  In 1968, Korea’s per capita income was $195 in current dollars, against $4,491 of the US. 
In 1969, Brazil’s per capita income was $400, against $4,803 of the US. The income data are 
from www.nationmasters.com, which are from the World Bank and the CIA.   17 
POSCO or EMBRAER, ventures that “rational” private sector firms did not want to touch 
with a barge pole.   
If we do not need to assume that bureaucrats are omniscient in order to justify 
industrial policy, we can have a much more meaningful discussion on how to improve the 
quality of industrial policy. If some bureaucrats were indeed better businessmen than 
capitalists, we can learn how to run better industrial policy by asking what kind of people 
they were, how they made the decisions, and how they implemented them – in the same spirit 
with which we read books by and about famous businessmen. If bureaucrats could make 
better decisions simply because  they had more “systemic”  perspectives, we can perhaps 
improve private sector decisions by encouraging the formation of industry associations or a 
national business association. We should also discuss whether there are organisational forms 
that encourage even more long-term-oriented and more systemic thinking in the bureaucracy. 
 
Political Economy: Leadership, Bureaucracy, and Power 
The state being able to improve upon market outcomes thanks to the more systemic 
and longer-term perspective is only the starting point of running a good industrial policy. The 
debate has revealed that a key difference between industrial-policy success stories and failure 
stories is that the former had states that could impose strict discipline on the recipients of its 
supports (Toye 1987; Amsden 1989; Chang 1994; Evans 1995). Since the state conducting 
industrial policy is at least partially  suspending market discipline, it has to supply the 
necessary discipline itself. If government supports are seen as “hand-outs”, rather than 
“advances” for the delivery of good performance, the recipients of government supports will 
have no incentive to perform.   
Many complex political economy issues have been debate over the years, but let me 
try to present what I consider to be the key lessons at three levels of political economy – that   18 
of political leadership, internal control structure of the state, and the power of the state vis-à-
vis the rest of the society. 
  First, the question of the nature of the top leadership. It cannot be a priori assumed 
that the leaders running a particular state is interested in economic development, whether 
through industrial policy or not. In order to appreciate this point, we do not need to go to the 
extreme and all top political leaders are “predators” interested only in personal wealth and 
aggrandisement  (although some may well  be).  Even if they are  interested in economic 
development, the leaders may have the “wrong” vision. They may be looking backward, 
rather than forward –  Thomas Jefferson and his followers  were vehemently opposed to 
Hamilton’s policy, as they wanted to preserve a society made up of respected landlords and 
yeoman farmers (plus the slaves). Or the political leaders may be hostile to private sector 
development, as many developing country leaders were in the 1960s and the 1970s. Or, as 
many 19
th  century liberal politicians did,  they may think that  doing nothing,  other than 
protecting private property is really the best policy.   
Second, even if the political leaders are interested in promoting economic 
development through industrial policy, they need to impose this vision on the rest of the state 
apparatus. While in theory the state is a hierarchical organization, in practice the wish at the 
top does not always permeate through the hierarchy. Once again, we don’t need to go to the 
extreme and assume that government officials are seeking only their own self-interests (e.g., 
self-seeking bureaucracy approach of Niskanen) to see this point. There will naturally be 
some degree of self-seeking, but many real-life bureaucrats are dedicated public servants. 
However, there would still be problems arising from clashing visions (e.g., the bureaucrats 
may be more conservative than the political leaders), turf wars between different groups 
within the bureaucracy, “tunnel vision” that specialized organizations are wont to develop, 
internal coordination failures (coming from poor organizational design or the emergence of   19 
new issues that cut across the existing organizational structure), and many other reasons.   
Third, even if everyone in the government, from the top leader down to the lowliest 
clerk, shares the same vision about industrial policy, the state still has to be able to impose its 
will on other agents in the society.  Needless to say, the feasibility of this differs across 
countries (and across issues, even within the same country). In some extreme cases, the state 
may not even have full control of its claimed territories. In some developing countries, the 
state may not be able to implement policies because it is short of manpower and resources, 
especially when they try to influence an industry with numerous small firms, where 
monitoring is costly. Even when the state has enough enforcement capabilities, there will be 
attempts by some private sector agents to neutralize or even pervert policies through lobbying 
and bribing. Some groups may have such influence in the society that the state does things 
that they want or refrain from doing things that they do not want, even without explicit 
lobbying or outright corruption, as we are witnessing these days in relation to the financial 
industry in countries like the US or the UK. 
Thus seen, between accepting the need for industrial and actually implementing it, 
there is a huge range of political economy problems, when considering that many developing 
countries are run by flawed leaders presiding over a politically weak and internally 
fragmented state, it seems difficult to imagine how industrial policy, even if it were “correct”, 
can be implemented well in a developing country. 
However, we should not let the best to be the enemy of the good. The existence of 
numerous political economy problems should not make us believe that therefore we have to 
wait for a perfect state to emerge before doing anything.   
In the real world, successful countries are the ones that have managed to find “good 
enough” solutions to their political economy problems and went on to implement policies, 
rather than sitting around bemoaning the imperfect nature of their political system. Of course,   20 
in the long run, these countries also invested in improving their state, including the quality of 
the bureaucracy (more on this later), interest-group organisations, and the very nature of their 
society (on the history of institutional development in today’s rich countries, see Chang 2002, 
ch. 3). 
Quite a few of them, including some of the successful “industrial policy states”, 
overcame their political obstacles to effective statecraft in situations that did not instil much 
hope. For example, between the fall of Napoleon and the end of the Second World War, the 
French state was notoriously laissez-faire, ineffectual, and conservative. However, this was 
completely changed after the War, with the rise of Gaullisme, the establishment of the 
planning commission and the foundation of the ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration), the 
famous school for elite bureaucrats (Cohen, 1977; Kuisel, 1981). For another example, the 
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) bureaucracy had been arguably one of the most corrupt and 
inefficient in modern history when it ruled mainland China, but after being forced to migrate 
to Taiwan it was transformed into an efficient and relatively clean one. This was done through 
a gradual but deliberate process of building “islands of competence” and then giving them 
greater responsibilities as they succeed and increase their legitimacy and status within the 
bureaucracy, finally replacing much of the old bureaucracy with the new one (Wade 1990). 
So, rather than assuming away the political economy problems (as some proponents 
of industrial policy have done) or using it as an excuse for policy inaction (as some opponents 
of industrial policy have done), we should find ways to devise imperfect but workable 
solutions to those problems. In order to take the debate forward, we have to improve our 
understanding of issues like: (i) how effective political visions can be formed and deployed to 
inspire various individuals and groups to act in a concerted manner; (ii) how to build nations 
and communities out of groups that may have very long history of hostility and mistrust; (iii) 
how to work out social pacts and build lasting collations behind them; (iv) how to partially   21 
accept but improve the customs and organisational routines in the bureaucracy; (v) how to 
minimise socially harmful lobbying and bribing while maximising the flows of information 
between the states and the private sector. In order to fully address these issues, we economists 
need to go beyond the usual boundaries and work with  practitioners (e.g., politicians, 
government officials, businessmen) as well as academics from other fields (e,g., political 
science, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies).   
 
Bureaucratic Capabilities: Important, But Not in the Way We Think   
However willing and strong the state may be and however “correct” its vision may be, 
policies are likely to fail if the government officials implementing them are not capable. 
Difficult decisions have to be made with limited information and fundamental uncertainty, 
often under political pressure from inside and outside the country, and this requires decision-
makers with intelligence and adequate knowledge. 
On this ground, people have argued that “difficult” policies like (selective) industrial 
policy should not be tried by countries with limited bureaucratic capabilities. And it is for this 
reason that World Bank (1993) recommended the Southeast Asian countries, in which 
industrial policy was quite  circumscribed partly in recognition of relatively low-quality 
bureaucracy, as models of industrial policy for other developing countries.   
At the general level, I  cannot dispute the proposition that we need capable 
bureaucrats in order to design and implement good policies. I agree too that a policy that has 
succeeded spectacularly in a country can turn into a mess in another country in the hands of 
incompetent bureaucrats, in the same way in which the same recipe can result in a 
masterpiece by a top chef, a good dish by a good cook, and a total culinary disaster by an 
incompetent cook. I also agree that different policies differ in their difficulties and therefore 
policies need to be chosen according to the relevant government’s capabilities.   22 
Unfortunately, these sensible points are often assembled into the policy-world 
equivalent of “do not  try this at home” warning that accompanies the demonstration of 
difficult and dangerous tricks in TV shows. It is argued that industrial policy is so difficult 
that it should never be tried by countries that do not have an East Asian-style high-quality 
bureaucracy, which in effect means all developing countries. Is this acceptable? 
First, one critical assumption behind the “do not try this at home”  (DNTTAH) 
argument is that industrial policy is exceptionally difficult. However, the assumption is made 
without any theoretical reasoning or empirical evidence. For example, World Bank (1993) 
assumes that policies getting the “fundamentals” right – such as human capital, agriculture, 
and macroeconomic stability – are easier than industrial policy, but there can be no such 
presumption. First, different governments have competences in different areas – the Japanese 
government was good at industrial policy, but really messed up its macroeconomic policies in 
the 1990s. Second, the ease of a policy will also partly depend on its scale. For example, 
promoting a few industries may be a lot easier than organising a mass education programme. 
Third, it will also depend on the number of agents involved in the policy. Trying to coordinate 
investments among a few large firms may be a lot easier than organising a country-wide 
distribution of subsidised fertiliser that involve millions of small farmers who are not 
organised into co-operatives and scattered all over the country.   
Second, another, implicit, assumption behind the DNTTAH argument is that 
industrial policy requires sophisticated knowledge of economics, as exemplified  by the 
following comment by Alan Winters, one-time head of Research Department at the Bank and 
now the chief economist of the UK government’s DfID (Department for International 
Development) – “the application of second-best economics needs first-best economists, not 
its usual complement of third- and fourth-raters” declares (Winters 2003, as cited in Stiglitz 
& Charlton 2005, p. 37). But is this true? The interesting thing is that, while the East Asian   23 
bureaucracies were staffed by smart people, they were certainly not “first best economists”. 
Indeed, most of them were not even economists. The Japanese economic officials that 
engineered the country’s “miracle” were mostly lawyers by training. Until the 1980s, what 
little economics they knew were mostly of the “wrong” kind – the economics of Karl Marx 
and Friedrich List, rather than neoclassical economics. In Taiwan, most key economic 
bureaucrats were engineers and scientists, as is the case in China today. Korea also had a high 
proportion of lawyers in its economic bureaucracy until the 1970s, while the brains behind 
the Korean HCI programme in the 1970s, Oh Won-Chul, was an engineer by training. Both 
Taiwan and Korea had rather strong, albeit officially unacknowledged, communist influence 
in its economic thinking until the 1970s.
8
Third, many people who advance the DNTTAH argument believe that high-quality 
bureaucracies are very difficult to build and that the East Asian countries were exceptionally 
lucky to have inherited them from history. However, high-quality bureaucracy can be built 
pretty quickly, as shown by the examples of Korea and Taiwan themselves. Contrary to the 
popular myth, Korea and Taiwan did not start their economic “miracles” with high-quality 
bureaucracies. For example, until the late 1960s, Korea used to send its bureaucrats for extra 
training to – of all places – Pakistan and the Philippines. Taiwan also had a similar problem 
of generally low bureaucratic capabilities in the 1950s and most of the 1960s (see above). 
 
                                                       
8  The Nationalist Party’s constitution was a copy of the Soviet Communist Party constitution. 
Taiwan’s second president, Chiang Ching-Kuo, who succeeded his father Chiang Kai-Shek, 
was a communist as a young man and studied in Moscow with future leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party, including Deng Xiao-ping. Korea also had its share of communist 
influence. General Park Chung-Hee, who masterminded the Korean economic miracle, was a 
communist in his younger days, and was sentenced to death in 1949 for his involvement in a 
communist mutiny in the South Korean army, although he earned an amnesty by publicly 
denouncing communism. Many of his lieutenants were also communist in their young days.   24 
These countries could construct high-quality bureaucracies only because they invested in 
better training, organisational reform, and improvement in incentive systems. In addition, 
there was also a lot of “learning-by-doing”. By trying out industrial policy from early on, the 
East Asian bureaucrats could more quickly pick up and improve the capabilities they needed 
in effectively running industrial policy. In other words, there has to be some “trying at home”, 
if you aspire to become good enough to appear on TV with your own stunt act. 
Last but not least, the fact that something is “difficult” cannot be a reason not to 
recommend it. When it comes to personal advancement, we actually go to the other extreme 
and encourage our youngsters to become the best of the best (by reading their biographies 
and what not), when most of them are going to end up as production-line workers or shop 
assistants, rather than prime ministers or business tycoons. Even when it comes to countries, 
developing countries are routinely told  to adopt “best practice”  or  “global standard” 
institutions used by the richest countries, when many of them clearly do not have the 
capabilities to effectively run the American patent law, the British accounting system, or the 
Scandinavian welfare system. But when it comes to industrial policy, countries are told to aim 
low and not to try at all, or at best try to learn from Southeast Asia, rather than East Asia. I am 
all for people warning against the risks involved in “aiming high”, but why should countries 
aim low when it comes to industrial policy?   
The critics of industrial policy have made an important contribution by highlighting 
the importance of bureaucratic capabilities in implementing industrial policy. However, this 
does not mean that a country with low-quality bureaucracy should not aspire to implement 
“difficult” policies, like industrial policy (if it is difficult). Capabilities can be increased over 
time through deliberate investment and through learning-by-doing (in the “difficult” policies). 
To be more productive, the  debate should be on thing like: (i) exactly why is, or isn’t, 
industrial policy is more difficult than other policies?; (ii) if it is more difficult than other   25 
policies, can it be made “easier” by learning from “best practices”? (iii) if it is not capabilities 
in mainstream economics, what exactly are the bureaucratic capabilities that are needed for 
good industrial policy?; (iv) how can we build those capabilities most quickly and cheaply? 
 
Performance Measurement: Difficulties and Mitigations 
  Even with a willing, strong, and capable state, imposing discipline upon the 
recipients of state support is not a straightforward business. At the most general level, we can 
say that the recipients should be rewarded for good performance and punished for bad 
performance, but translating that principle into practice is not easy, not least because of the 
difficulties involved in measuring performance. 
Especially when industrial policy is comprehensive, as it was in the case of East Asia 
between the 1950s and the 1980s, objective performances become difficult to measure, as 
virtually all prices are “distorted”. There will also be efforts by the recipients of state help to 
manipulate the performance indicators. These are all real and serious problems, but  the 
industrial policy debate has revealed that there are ways to overcome them.   
First of all, when launching an industrial policy  programme, performance targets 
should be clearly specified and the reporting requirements on them set, so that the recipients 
cannot weasel their ways out of bad performance. Publicly announcing the targets will make 
their manipulation more difficult, but that will reduce policy flexibility (more on this below). 
Second, the targets should be set in consultation with the business community, so that 
they are realistic and do not simply reflect some bureaucratic dreams. However, they should 
not be set purely on the basis of what bueinssspeople say, as they are likely to over-state the 
difficulties and under-state their strengths, so there have to be independent third opinions 
provided by technical experts, academics, journalists, and the like. The deliberation councils 
that was used in Japan and to a lesser extent in Korea show how this process can be managed   26 
(Johnson 1982; Dore 1986; World Bank 1993). 
Third, targets need to be revised along the way – they may prove too easy, too 
difficult, or be unexpectedly affected by external shocks. In particular, it is important for the 
government to acknowledge mistakes quickly and change policies, as in East Asia. Having 
said that, government flexibility can be abused by lobbying groups, so too much flexibility 
should be avoided. 
Fourth, in industries where export is possible, export performance should be given a 
high status as a performance measure, as in the East Asian countries, especially in Korea. 
Export performance indicators are far less open to manipulation by the recipients of state 
supports than are domestic market performance indicators, especially when the firms in 
question have significant market powers.   
Fifth, policy-makers need to pay more attention to the trends in performance 
indicators, rather than their absolute levels at any give point of time. This is particularly 
important in programmes with a long time horizon, such as the plan to develop  the 
automobile industry in Japan and Korea, which took literally two, three decades before 
bearing full fruits. 
Once again, it is time for the debate to move on. Rather than debating whether setting 
and enforcing effective performance targets is possible (as it certainly is), we should 
concentrate on questions like: (i) what  performance indicators should be used for which 
industries?; (ii) how do we set credible performance targets without becoming too rigid about 
them?; (iii) how does the government listen to the private sector without being beholden to 
it?; (iv) how do we operate with a long but not infinite time horizon? 
 
The Importance of Export-related Industrial Policy 
  I have just discussed the role of export in helping the state to better discipline the   27 
recipients of its supports by providing a  relatively objective and hard-to-manipulate 
performance indicator, but export has other important roles  to play in the conduct  of 
industrial policy in developing countries. 
  To put it bluntly, economic development is impossible without good export 
performance. Economic development requires importation of advanced technologies, in the 
form of either  machines  or technology licensing,  which need to paid for  with  foreign 
currencies. Unless a  country is very small and/or very strategically located that it gets 
disproportionately large amounts of foreign aid and/or  foreign direct investment,  it  will 
simply have to export its way out of poverty. 
  The failure to promote export enough is one of the key reasons  that the Latin 
American industrial policies  were  not as successful as those in East Asia. In the Latin 
American countries, economic growth kept hitting the balance of payments constraints. Even 
with its huge export machinery and massive government supports for exports (e.g., subsidised 
bank loans, tariff rebates for imported inputs used for exports, export marketing support from 
the state trading agency), Korea found it impossible to export enough to finance its rapid rate 
of capital accumulation until the late 1980s, running a structural trade deficit. 
  So far, I am singing from the same hymn sheet as that of the World Bank. However, 
saying that export is the key to economic development is not to say that developing countries 
should liberalise their trade and closely follow their comparative advantages.   
Of course, at the beginning of its economic development process, a country should 
try to increase its exports from its existing industries and other “non-traditional” industries 
where it has comparative advantages (e.g., salmon in Chile, coffee in Vietnam, cut flowers in 
some African countries). The widespread view is that these industries do not need any export 
help because they are in line with the country’s comparative advantage, but this is wrong.   
Export success requires significant industrial policy even for comparative advantage-  28 
conforming  industries, especially if they are “non-traditional” industries, where  new 
productive capabilities may have to be built. The basic problem is that export markets have 
high fixed costs of entry, which smaller firms and farmers, who are likely to dominate these 
comparative advantage-conforming  industries,  may not be able to bear. Direct export 
subsidies can offset the entry costs, but these are now banned by the WTO, except for the 
LDCs (least developed countries), and thus help should be provided through other channels.   
First, state marketing help can be crucial, especially smaller exporters, as exemplified 
by the cases of JETRO and KOTRA, respectively the state trading agency of Japan and Korea, 
and by the Danish agricultural marketing boards in the early 20
th century (on the Danish case, 
see Chang 2009). Second, the state could share risk with exporters through schemes like loan 
guarantees for exporters and insurance for payment defaults. Third, it can help exporters, 
especially small producers, meet the high quality standards required in the export markets. 
This can be done through things like export product quality control, provision of advice on 
sanitary and python-sanitary requirements in the agricultural export markets, provision of 
subsidised extension service for small farmers and for small manufacturing firms engaged in 
exporting. Fourth, the state can indirectly help the exporters by providing legal and financial 
supports for co-operative arrangements among them for joint provision of export marketing, 
R&D, processing facilities (e.g., creamery, slaughter house), and transport facilities (e.g., 
refrigerated trucks) (Chang 2009).    
In the longer run, if a country is to continue the momentum of its export success, it is 
not enough to rely on its comparative advantage-conforming industries. Especially given the 
nature of the industries that developing countries are likely to start their export drives with, 
export growth is likely to peter out soon after the initial stage and even a little rise in wages 
(which the export success will bring) may undermine the country’s position in the world 
market.  Sooner or later it will have to  upgrade its export industries  into comparative   29 
advantage-defying industries, which requires even stronger industrial policy. 
A good example of this is Korea. In the 1950s, Korea’s main exports were things like 
tungsten ore, fish, seaweed, and basic textiles and garments. In the 1960s, the government 
developed  “non-traditional”  export industries like wigs, plywood, shoes, and cheap 
electronics assembly, with the help of massive export support programmes, while upgrading 
existing export industries, especially  the textile and the garment industries.  By the early 
1970s, however, many of these export industries, especially plywood and wigs, were hitting 
the wall, so it launched the HCI (Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation) programme, 
developing industries like shipbuilding, steel, petrochemical,  automobile, and high-end 
electronics as export industries, despite the fact that it did not have comparative advantage in 
these industries at the time.  Without these industries, however, Korea would not have 
sustained its export growth momentum beyond the 1970s.   
Indeed, what truly distinguishes  the  East Asian countries  from other developing 
countries is not that they  had  “freer”  trade  than others.  After all, they  had plenty of 
protectionism – average industrial tariff rates were 30-40% both in Korea and Taiwan until 
the 1970s, while both of them had numerous non-tariff trade barriers. The real difference is 
that, in East Asia, free trade, export promotion (which is, of course, not free trade), and infant 
industry protection were organically integrated, both in cross-section terms (so there always 
will be some industries subject to each category of policy, sometimes more than one at the 
same time) and over time (so, the same industry may be subject to more than one of the three 
over time). 
Therefore, while emphasising the importance of export for economic development, 
we need to abandon the “export promotion vs. import substitution”  dichotomy that has 
dogged the industrial policy debate for far too long. We need to debate how exactly to mix 
free trade, export promotion, and infant industry protection – across sectors and over time –   30 
in a manner that helps a country to upgrade its industrial structure and grow fast. We also 
need to discuss the factors that determine the optimal mix of these three types of trade policy 
and the timing of switching between them. 
 
Changing Global Environment 
Considerable changes have happened to the global economy since the heyday of 
industrial policy between the 1950s and the 1980s. Two mutually-reinforcing sets of changes 
have happened – changes in global business environment and changes in global trade and 
investment rules –  that people argue have made industrial policy almost impossible to 
implement. Later I will more closely look at the latter changes, which are more directly 
relevant to our discussion, but let me first make some brief comments on the former changes. 
The changes in global business environment can be broken into two related 
components. The first is the increase in the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
the other is the so-called  “global business revolution”, which has led to enormous 
concentrations at the top tiers of the global value chain, which in turn has forced 
consolidation down the value chain. 
The rising important of FDI has made a lot of commentators to think that now it is 
very difficult, if not totally impossible, for countries to use “nationalistic” industrial policies 
for fear of transnational corporations (TNCs) moving away.   
While the relative importance of FDI has increased enormously since the 1990s, the 
changes are not as dramatic as they are often thought to be.
9
                                                       
9  The absolute amount of FDI going into the developing countries has increased by about 14 
times from around $21 billion during 1983-9 to around $297 billion during 2002-7. FDI as a 
share of gross fixed capital formation in developing countries has gone up from around 3.3% 
during the 1980s to 11-12% since the second half of the 1990s (partly reflecting the relative 
  The pace of change may slow   31 
down, as the current crisis is forcing TNCs to retrench. In the longer run, the trend may even 
be reversed –  after all, globalisation has once been reversed during the interwar period. 
Moreover, mobility of TNCs differs enormously across industries and in relation to different 
countries, so the feasibility of “nationalistic” policies depends on the industry and the country 
(Chang 1998; Chang 2007, ch. 4). A country with a large domestic market and good supply 
side conditions (e.g., skills, infrastructure) may implement a very nationalist policy in an 
industry with low mobility (e.g., automobile, steel), but a country without those conditions 
cannot do the same, especially when it comes to high-mobility industries (e.g., garments, 
shoes). Also, empirical studies reveal that industrial policy, such as performance requirement 
on TNCs, is not as important as the market conditions (the size and the growth of the 
domestic market), infrastructure, or quality of labour force in influencing  FDI  decisions 
(Chang 1998; Kumar 2005). 
Since the 1980s but accelerating since the 1990s, there has been an enormous increase 
in industrial concentration, starting with the top of the global value chain and increasingly 
“cascading down” lower the chain – a process that has been named the “global business 
revolution” by Nolan, Zhang, and Liu (2008). It has been pointed out that this revolution has 
enormously raised the entry barriers to higher-end industries faced by developing countries.   
However, industry concentrations go up and down in the long run, so it is not certain 
that the current trend will continue forever. Especially given the turmoil in the world 
economy today, new spaces may open up for developing country companies higher up the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
decline in investment during this period). The share of developing countries in world FDI has 
gone up from 17.7 % during 1983-89 to 20.7% during 1996-2007, if we exclude China (from 
19.6% to 24.3%, if we include China). The data are from various issues of World Investment 
Report by UNCTAD. 
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value chain with the decline of existing producers (particularly visible in at all levels of the 
automobile industry at the moment), while a lot of recent mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
which have come to account for an increasingly higher share of FDI, may be undone. Also, in 
the long run,when new industries emerge, opportunities open up for new entrants (e.g., East 
Asia and the electronics revolution), so some developing countries may be able to emerge as 
major players in some new industries in the future. Moreover, value chains have become 
more  “chopped up”  and internationalised, opening up new opportunities for developing 
country producers. Developing countries can now enter lower segments of those industries 
that used to be vertically integrated and located only in the rich countries (e.g., automobile), 
although in this way they are highly unlikely to reach the top of the chain. 
More directly relevant for this paper than the changes in business landscape is the 
changes in global rules of trade and investment. The use of many of the classic tools of 
industrial policy are now either banned or significantly circumscribed by the WTO. 
Quantitative restrictions (quotas) have been banned altogether. Tariffs have been reduced and 
“bound”. Export subsidies are banned, except for the LDCs. Most other subsidies have 
become  open to countervailing duties and other retaliatory measures. New issues, like 
regulations on FDI and intellectual property rights, have been brought under the jurisdiction 
of the WTO, making it difficult for countries to “borrow” foreign technologies “for free” or 
put performance requirements on TNCs. 
Thus seen, the WTO has certainly made industrial policy more difficult to implement. 
However, the constraints imposed by the WTO should not be exaggerated. 
First, even on paper, the WTO by no means obliges countries to abolish all tariffs, and 
many developing countries have decided on tariff ceilings that are still considerable.
10
                                                       
10  Some countries reduced such ceilings substantially – for example, India cut its trade-
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course, if the rich countries have their ways in the current NAMA (non-agricultural market 
access) negotiations of the Doha Round in the WTO, industrial tariffs in the developing 
countries are, at 5-10% likely to be the lowest level since the days of colonialism and unequal 
treaties (Chang 2005, p. 4). However, this is yet to happen. 
Second, there are still provisions for emergency tariff increases (“import surcharges”) 
on two grounds. The first is a sudden surge in sectoral imports, which a number of countries 
have already used. The second is the overall BOP (balance of payments) problem, for which 
almost all developing countries qualify and which quite a few countries have also used. Since 
countries have discretion on how much emergency tariffs to impose on which commodities, 
as far as these are on the whole commensurate with the scale of the BOP problem, there is 
still room for targeting. 
Third, not all subsidies are “illegal” for everyone. For example, the LDCs are allowed 
to use export subsidies. Subsidies for agriculture, regional development, basic R&D, 
environment-related technology upgrading were  allowed  (“non-actionable”  in WTO 
parlance) until 1999. Even though the first three have become “actionable” since 2000, not a 
single case has been brought to the dispute settlement mechanism since then, suggesting that 
there is an implicit agreement that they are still acceptable. Moreover, the subsidy restrictions 
only cover “trade-related” ones, which means that “domestic” subsidies can be used (e.g., 
subsidies on equipment investments, subsidies for investment in particular skills).   
Fourth, the TRIPS (trade-related intellectual property rights) agreement has certainly 
made technology absorption more expensive for developing countries (Chang 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
weighted average tariff from 71% to 32%. However, many countries, including India, have 
fixed them at relatively high levels – for example, Brazil cut its trade-weighted average tariff 
from 41% to 27%, Chile from 35% to 25%, Turkey from 25% to 22% (Amsden 2005, p. 219, 
table 11.2).   34 
However,  this mainly affects the middle-income countries. The technologies that many 
developing countries need are often the ones that are too old to have patents. 
Last,  as  for  the TRIMS (trade-related investment measures)  agreement,  it bans 
measures like local contents requirements and trade balancing requirements, which had been 
successfully used by both the developed and the developing countries (Kumar 2005). 
However, countries can still impose conditions regarding the hiring of local labour (a good 
way to create technological spill-over effects), technology transfer, and the conduct of R&D 
in. They can also provided targeted subsidies, directed credits, and tailor-made infrastructure 
(measures that Singapore and Ireland have used, to attract FDI into “targeted” industries; 
Chang 2004), provided that these do not violate the MFN (most-favoured nation) provision 
(Thrasher and Gallagher 2008). 
Of course, even though the WTO rules allow quite a lot of industrial policy measures, 
especially for the LDCs, this space is in practice highly constrained by other international 
factors. In the case of the LDCs, the conditions attached to bilateral and multilateral aids and 
loans, on which they are quite dependent, significantly constrain their industrial policy space. 
Many developing countries are also parties to bilateral and regional trade and investment 
agreements, which tend to be more restrictive than the WTO (Thrasher and Gallagher 2008). 
So, all in all, the range of industrial policy measures that developing countries can use 
has become considerably smaller, compared to the heyday of industrial policy, partly because 
of the changing global business landscape but more importantly because of the changes in 
global rules of trade and investment. However, they still leave  room for manoeuvre for 
countries that are clever and determined enough. Moreover, especially with the current crisis, 
global business landscape can change significantly, opening up unexpected possibilities of 
moving up and across global value chains for at least some developing countries. As for the 
global rules of trade and investment, it is not as if they are some unalterable laws of nature   35 




In this paper, I have tried to  find some ways to  overcome what I consider  an 
unproductive confrontation between the proponents and the opponents of industrial policy 
and to take the debate forward by exploring some common grounds between the two groups. 
In the first substantive part of the paper, I briefly reviewed the debate on industrial 
policy, emphasising that we need to look beyond East Asia between the 1950s and the 1980s 
in order to deepen our understanding. While I explained why I think that the weight of 
evidence is in favour of industrial policy, my aim was not to declare who has “won” the 
debate (which is impossible to prove anyway) but to establish the minimum common 
empirical understanding for a more productive debate. This common understanding is that 
industrial policy can work –  sometimes spectacularly well –  although it can also fail – 
sometimes miserably. I think this is a moderate proposition, which most (albeit not all, I 
know) people on both sides of the debate can live with and on the basis of which they can 
engage in a pragmatic debate on how to make industrial policy work better. 
In the second, and main, substantive part of the paper, I looked at most (although not 
all) of what I regard as the key issues emerging from the industrial policy debate. I discussed 
some theoretical questions regarding whether targeting is desirable and whether the state can 
ever  “beat the market”. I looked  at implementation issues, ranging from “big”  political 
economy problems, through to questions surrounding bureaucratic capabilities, down to nitty-
gritty issues related to performance measurement. Picking on my emphasis on the importance 
of export performance as a performance indicator, I then talked about the critical importance 
of export policy, which requires not just free trade but a mixture of free trade, export   36 
promotion, and infant industry protection. I then discussed how the changing global business 
landscape and, more importantly, the recent changes in global rules of trade and investment 
are affecting the feasibility of industrial policy and how these will evolve themselves.   
While I could not avoid making some partial statements, given my well-known status 
as an advocate of industrial policy, my main purpose in this paper was to plea for “thinking 
outside the box” and finding the common grounds, for people on both sides of the debate.   
We, on both sides of the debate, have focused too much on “grand” things like the 
Big Push, when much of real-life industrial policy  has been about “boring”  things,  like 
getting the production scale right and providing export marketing services – not surprising 
when most practitioners of industrial policy over the last two centuries of industrial policy 
history have been pragmatic people who did not know many fancy economic theories. Some 
theoretical issues that both the proponents and the opponents consider to be critical actually 
dissolve into thin air, once seen from a pragmatic point of view (e.g., targeting, bureaucrats as 
businessmen). Many proponents of industrial policy do not fully appreciate how critical 
export is for the success of industrial policy, while many opponents do not fully appreciate 
how export success also requires industrial policy. We  often let sensible worries (e.g., 
political economy, bureaucratic capabilities) degenerate into a recommendation for inaction, 
letting the best become the enemy of the good. Real life success stories were often based on 
“good enough” compromises, rather than perfect solutions.   
Once the adversaries in the debate abandon theoretical grand standing and focus on 
more practical issue, there are vast and fertile middle grounds to explore. This is not to say 
that there won’t be disagreements in those grounds. However, there, at least the two sides can 
have productive debates on pragmatic things without thinking about destroying each other. 
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